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own image God made humankind.” The warrant is
God’s creating human beings in the divine image
rather than a specific political arrangement, say,
theocracy. The background is also the sixth commandment, “You shall not kill” (Exod 20 : 13), even
when interpreted in terms of murder and not killing. Punishment for idolatry has different warrant
than shedding blood and is not dependent on the
state or the sixth commandment. In Matt 15 : 4, Jesus teaches that “whoever speaks evil of father or
mother must surely die.” Yet there is no specification of the means of punishment, and Jesus, even
facing crucifixion, never resorts to force. Within the
Gospels there is an emphasis on forgiveness, although the state’s power of capital punishment is
not denied. Apostle Paul continues the theme. A
leader holding legitimate authority, indeed authority from God, “does not bear the sword in vain! It
is the servant of God to execute wrath on the
wrongdoer” (Rom 13 : 4). Thus, the Bible contains
various warrants for capital punishment (divine
command, the human as the image of God, the
right of a legitimate state, etc.) which assert the seriousness of the violation of the sixth commandment and the sovereignty of God.
Besides diversity in the Bible, Christians have
drawn on different theological and ethical ideas in
order to consider the legitimacy of capital punishment. Two basic patterns of thinking are dominant,
East and West. Many understand Jesus’ teaching
presented in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5–7)
to require the rejection of violence and the demand
of pacifism. The argument is twofold: the prohibition in the sixth commandment is absolute and
without exception, and, further, the example of Jesus’ action is normative for Christian life. The
Christian community is to be a community of peace
emblematic of the reign of God. Menno Simons and
the subsequent Peace Church tradition, for instance, assert that Christians should not take vows
or bear arms because Jesus did not. Capital punishment is contrary to the Gospel, and its use among
Christian too easily makes the church an agent of
the state. While the state is a legitimate social form,
it is not needed among Christians. In recent times
some Orthodox leaders focus on the centrality of
forgiveness as reasons against capital punishment.
Other thinkers have noted that capital punishment
is often used against the poor. Christian commitment to the poor should alert one to abuses of
state power.
The other dominant line of thinking draws on
different biblical, theological, and ethical warrants.
From Augustine to Martin Luther and John Calvin
as well as the long-tradition of just war thinking
and also Orthodox thinkers many arguments have
been made for the right use of lethal force, including capital punishment. The crucial claim, variously conceived, is that Christians exist within the
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“earthly city” (Augustine), under two governments – church and state – (Calvin), in two kingdoms (Luther), or in the “symphonic” relation of
church and state (Orthodox). Recent Christian realists continue the insight. Christians cannot escape
the vicissitudes of social and historical life, and the
ambiguities of history and society mean that in certain situations of self defense, preservation and restoration of civil peace, and the protection of the
weak and innocent, justice may require the use of
lethal force. The work of justice, including retributive justice, can be merciful. Augustine argued that
punishment keeps the sinner from further sin and
endangering their souls, a position that historically
took a fateful turn in the execution of heretics. Yet
the idea is that justice must approximate Christian
love, and, further, Christian commitments to forgiveness cannot compromise the demands of justice. Mindful of the ambiguity and possible abuse
of political power, in this pattern of thought God
is held sovereign over all things, and there are
goods which systems of justice must protect.
Divergent biblical warrants on capital punishment and the dominant strands of thinking intersect with different conceptions of the purpose of
punishment. If punishment is to reform the wrongdoer, then capital punishment terminates that possibility and is morally illicit. Conversely, if punishment is to restrain wickedness, restore peace after
its violation, punish the sinner, or manifest the
wrath of God, then capital punishment might be
justified. Each account of punishment is found
among Christians, and they cohere with the biblical
warrants and the theological ethical arguments
noted.
There is no unified Christian position on capital
punishment and this fact flows from diversity
within the Bible, different conceptions of the relation of the church to historical and socio-political
realities, and, finally, disputes about the purpose
of punishment. Despite contrasting judgments, the
impact of the Christian tradition over time has been
to mitigate excessive expressions of retributive justice with the message of mercy and forgiveness.
Bibliography: ■ Bailey, L. R./J. M. Efird, Capital Punishment:
What the Bible Says (Nashville, Tenn. 1986). ■ Berkowitz, B.
A., Execution and Invention: Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rabbinic and Christian Cultures (Oxford 2006). ■ Megivern, J. J.,
The Death Penalty: An Historical and Theological Survey (New
York 1997). ■ Stassen, G. (ed.), Captial Punishment: A Reader
(Cleveland, Ohio 1998).

William Schweiker

II. Judaism
The Bible specifies capital punishment for a wide
range of crimes against both God and man. Distinct
and paradoxical political realia, however, circumscribe its interpretation and implementation in
postbiblical Judaism. Capital jurisdiction is a test
case of political autonomy, and in the postbiblical
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era, full Jewish political autonomy has been limited
to the Second Temple era and the State of Israel. In
Second Temple Judaism, executions fell primarily
under the jurisdiction (or discretion) of the sovereign, such as Alexander Jannaeus or Herod. Any ties
understood to have existed between executions and
biblical strictures are unclear.
Only in the rabbinic period (2nd–5th cents. CE),
when Jews had no capital jurisdiction, do we find
extensive treatment of the topic in biblical terms.
The trajectories of the rabbinic discussion are
twofold:
(1) The rabbis give vivid detail to the schematic
biblical picture of capital punishment, discussing:
which crimes merit death; the composition of the
court; collection of evidence; interrogation of witnesses; conduct of judges throughout the trial; the
precise modes of execution; and even the proper
mourning by the family of the executed. According
to rabbinic law, a person accused of a capital offense
must be tried before a court of 23 judges (mSan 1 : 4)
and accused by two sanctioned witnesses, who in
the course of proving guilt with epistemological
certainty, must also prove that the accused was
warned of the precise consequences of the crime
and had acknowledged the warning prior to the
crime (mSan 5 : 1–4; bSan 8b, 40b). If condemned,
the crime merits one of four punishments: stoning,
burning, beheading, or strangling (mSan 6–7). Of
these, only stoning and burning have clear biblical
antecedents. The biblical authority of the other two
are driven by hermeneutical, jurisprudential, and
theological principles, and are in places clearly influenced by the Roman milieu in which they were
articulated.
(2) Mishnah Makkot 1 : 10 reads:
A sanhedrin that executes once in seven years, is called
murderous. R. Eliezer b. Azariah says: once in seventy
years. R. Tarfon and R. Aqiva say: If we were members
of a sanhedrin, no person would ever be put to death.
Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel remarked: They would
also multiply murderers in Israel.

This Mishnah holds contradictory views in tension,
namely the belief that the evils of capital punishment outweigh its legality and the belief that capital punishment prevents even more bloodshed. The
rabbis thus weave a second strain of biblical interpretation throughout their explication of the process, one that radically questions and functionally
rejects human authority over capital punishment
either on the basis of its inherent wrongness or on
the basis of the flawed nature of the human tribunal and the fear of error. Exaggerated standards of
proof make conviction all but impossible. Even the
odd descriptions of how to kill the condemned encode moral imperatives, such as the need to minimize human suffering (cf. Lev 19 : 18 “love your
neighbor as yourself”) and to preserve dignity. The
body, as the image of God, should remain unblemished, and the executioner, whose actions should
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imitate the way God himself kills (mSan 4 : 5; bSan
45a, 52b; MekY Neziqin 5). The rabbis interlace the
discussion of capital punishment with implicit and
explicit explorations of morality, anthropology,
theology, epistemology, jurisprudence, and, to a
lesser extent, politics.
Medieval commentators within the rabbinic tradition mostly reiterate these traditional positions.
Maimonides states: “It is better and more satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put
a single innocent man to death” (Sefer ha-Mitswot,
negative commandments 290). However, in contrast to the classical rabbis, in the Middle Ages,
some Jewish communities, e.g., in Muslim Spain,
had capital authority and used it, albeit in a sporadic and limited way. Given both the absence of
a sanhedrin and the broader talmudic abrogation,
however, execution struck some as illegitimate, and
there seem to have been attempts to avoid directly
transgressing rabbinic law, for example, executing
the condemned by extrarabbinic modes or out of
deference to custom (Assaf: no. 28). A tradition tied
to the talmudic discussion of the Noahide laws
builds a conceptual edifice permitting execution on
less stringent evidentiary standards so as to serve
the demands of ruling a community. Some sources
argue for exemption from the demands of certainty
that restrained the rabbinic court, placing the interests of the community over those of strict justice
(e.g., Isaac bar Sheshet, Responsa Ribash 234, 251
[late 14th cent.]); cited in Nagar vs. State of Israel
[1980] (in Elon 1999: 202); bSan 57b; Maimonides,
MishT, Sefer Shoftim, Hilkhot Melakhim 9 : 14).
In modern Israel, after initial debate, capital
punishment was rejected on the basis of humanitarian arguments built on rabbinic grounds. It is permitted only in cases of treason, genocide, and
crimes against the Jewish people. Note that in Israel, licit execution happens by shooting or hanging, neither of which is a rabbinic mode. The Nazi
war criminal Adolph Eichmann was the only person
ever executed in Israel; he was hanged in 1962.
Orthodox Judaism holds that since capital punishment is mandated by God, execution is not in
itself repugnant. However, the lack of a truly pious
court renders it impossible to administer. The other
branches of Judaism draw on similar sources and
ideas but more directly confront execution as itself
problematic. However, debate remains open, and
each side can claim talmudic and biblical prooftexts.
ø atimat ha-TalBibliography: ■ Assaf, S., Ha-Onshin Ahø arei H
mud (Jerusalem 1922). [Heb.] ■ Berkowitz, B. A., Execution
and Invention: Death Penalty Discourse in Early Rabbinic and
Christian Cultures (New York 2006). ■ Cohen, H. H, “Capital
Punishment,” in Principles of Jewish Law (ed. M. Elon; Jerusalem 1975) 526–30. ■ Elon, M., Jewish Law: History, Sources,
Principles, 4 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa. 1994); trans. of id. HaMishpat ha-Ivri, 3 vols. (Jerusalem 1973). ■ Elon, M. et al.
(eds.), Jewish Law: Cases and Materials (New York 1999). [Esp.
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200–205] ■ Lorberbaum, Y., Image of God, Halakhah and Aggadah (Tel Aviv 2004). [Heb.] ■ Rakover, N., “Jewish Law
and the Noahide Obligation to Preserve Social Order,” Car■ Shemesh, A.,
dozo Law Review 12 (1990/91) 1073–136.
Punishments and Sins: From Scripture to the Rabbis (Jerusalem
2003). [Heb.] ■ Steinmetz, D., “Crimes and Punishments,”
JJS 55/1 (2004) 81–101; 55/2 (2004) 278–305.

Natalie B. Dohrmann

III. Islam
Capital punishment in Islamic discourse is mainly
associated with crimes or transgressions committed
by man against the will of God (crimes against fellow humans are called tazı̄r). The Qurān informs
the reader/listener about the hø udūd Allāh, “God’s
boundaries.” This phrase occurs 12 times in the
Qurān, for example, “These are God’s boundaries,
do not approach them” (S 2 : 187), and “These are
God’s boundaries, do not transgress them. Whoever
does transgress God’s boundaries, those are the
wrongdoers” (S 2 : 229). These two examples indicate that hø udūd Allāh are a warning to prevent people from committing crimes. Some theologians
hold that it is better to be disciplined and repent in
this life than to end up in hell. From this point of
view, it is clear that hø udūd (sg. hø add) is part and parcel of the qurānic reward and punishment stories.
Those believers who remain within the boundaries
shall be rewarded in the afterlife, while sinners will
be tormented in hell.
As R. Kimber (2001) points out, there is a similarity between the qurānic hø udūd and the biblical
hø uqqı̄m/hø uqqōt (boundaries, statutes of God; cf. Lev
18 : 4–5, 26; 19 : 19, 37; 26 : 3, 15; Num 30 : 17; Deut
5 : 1; 6 : 1, 24; 26 : 16–7; Exod 18 : 16). Both the
Qurān and the HB/OT mainly discuss these concepts in relation to marital or family relations. Even
though there are many similarities, there are also
important differences between Islamic and Judaic
jurisprudence (cf. Kimber 2001).
The application of hø udūd Allāh is dependent on
theological interpretations of the Sharı̄‘a, which, it
is clear, have varied over time and depend on local
contexts. However, this concept is generally associated with adultery, fornication, theft, highway robbery, use of intoxicants and apostasy, all crimes that
should be punished with corporal punishment (in
the form of flogging, stoning and amputations).
The strictest punishments are applied in Saudi Arabia and Iran, but elsewhere in the modern Muslim
world they have fallen largely into disuse (Pearl
1995: 1). Islamists in countries such as Pakistan, Sudan and Nigeria have nonetheless lately campaigned for the re-introduction and application of
the hø udūd punishments.
The main difference between the so-called
hø udūd crimes and other felonies is the important
fact that the sin is committed against God and not
against humankind. Consequently, the strictness of
the judgments and the severity of the penalties im-
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posed are based on the fact that it is the “right of
God” (hø aqq Allāh) to chastize those who transgress
his boundaries/limits (Carra de Vaux: 116).
 add,” Shorter EncycloBibliography: ■ Carra de Vaux, B., “H
paedia of Islam (Leiden 41995 [= 11953]) 115–16. ■ Kimber,
R., “Boundaries and Precepts,” Encyclopaedia of the Qurān 1
■ Pearl, D. S.,
(Leiden/Boston, Mass. 2001) 252–54.
 udūd,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World
“H
(New York/Oxford 1995) 137–38.

Göran Larsson

IV. Literature
In “As I please” (Nov. 1944), Orwell wisely retracts
his comment that no one “ever writes of an execution with approval.” The God of Gen 9 actually requires capital punishment because, if man is made
in God’s image, murder is blasphemous. Inconsistently, rather than killing David for murdering
Uriah, God condemns David and Bathsheba’s child
(2 Sam 12). However, although the Torah prescribes
death for sins ranging from homosexuality (Lev 20)
to Sabbath-breaking (Exod 31) and rape (Deut 22),
talmudic “barriers” ensure that it is rarely imposed
(Rosenberg: 1169); the Jews tell Pilate that it is unlawful for them to execute anyone (John 18). While
Paul concedes the state’s right to execute citizens
(Rom 13), Jesus prevents the Pharisees from stoning
an adulterous woman (John 8).
Condemned Christians often imitate Christ’s
example of patient courage: St. Stephen (Acts 6–8)
and St. Cecilia in Chaucer’s “Second Nun’s Tale”
(ca. 1390) face death with rousing speeches; Thomas
More’s letter to his daughter (1535) hopes that “we
may merrily meet in heaven”; and in Marvell’s “Horatian Ode” (1650), Charles I lays his head on the
scaffold “as upon a Bed.” Both Villon in “Ballade
des Pendus” (ca. 1450) and Cawdor in Shakespeare’s
Macbeth (1606) express repentance. In contrast,
Tichborne’s “Elegy” (1586) voices a youth’s despair
at what Orwell’s “A Hanging” (1931) calls “The unspeakable wrongness … of cutting a life short … in
full tide.”
The trope of Christian acceptance leads some
novelists to mute execution’s horror: Dickens’s sentimental account of Carton’s death in A Tale of Two
Cities (1859); Melville’s “Billy Budd” (1891), where
the “angelic” hero does not twitch when hanged;
the reprieve of the infanticide Hetty in George Eliot’s Adam Bede (1859). Without a victim’s acceptance, capital punishment is doubly appalling: the
murderer in Hugo’s Le dernier jour d’un condamné
(1829) crying inwardly that it is “impossible” that
he will not receive mercy; Fagin’s last terrified, unrepentant night in Dickens’s Oliver Twist (1838).
However, the observer’s acceptance in Wordsworth’s
“Sonnets on the Punishment of Death” (1839)
seems pietistic; in Boswell’s Life of Samuel Johnson
(1791), Johnson offers Dodds spiritual comfort
rather than questioning so harsh a penalty for forgery. Boswell’s own obsession with hangings is a
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